Three new papers that evaluate different aspects of introducing centralized student assignment (matricula digital) reforms that incorporate parental choice using a DA algorithm.  Our team at IDB supported this work in Ecuador, Peru and Pernambuco, Brazil in collaboration with Christopher Neilson (Yale) and colleagues at the Edtech Consiliumbots.

The first working paper Can information on school attributes and placement probabilities direct search and choice? Evidence from choice platforms in Ecuador and Peru experimentally evaluates how providing personalized information on schooling alternatives and placement risk influences family applications and assignment outcomes.

The second working paper The welfare effects of including household preferences in school assignment systems: Evidence from Ecuador examines the welfare produced by a centralized assignment system that is based on household distance to schools (previous enrollment system in Ecuador) to the matches it produces in a system that includes household preferences using a DA algorithm.

The third technical note (in Portuguese) Incentivando alunos vulneráveis a frequentar escolas de tempo integral: evidências sobre o uso do nudge em Pernambuco experimentally evaluates a behavioral strategy designed on the centralized choice platform to induce disadvantaged families to apply to extended day schools (escolas integrais) in Pernambuco.  The state has expanded access to these programs but struggled to attract low-income families to apply to extended day schools. Link: Pernambuco experiment to attract disadvantaged families to escolas integrais