AU: Maria, there was one key decision that was made. I don’t know if it was actually made or I don’t know how conscious the decision was, but after 1991, there was the option to reintegrate the Academy of Sciences and their laboratory facilities and their scientists into the university systems. This was a step that the Baltic countries played after they left the Soviet Union, but it didn’t happen in Russia and that deprived the universities of those resources and assets that would have allowed them to become multiversities in the sort of North American and European sense. Why didn’t that happen in Russia and what were the consequences?
MY: The main reason was that research institutes were totally not interested in that. For many years, for decades, they got direct budgets from the government, and they could do basic research for that. They got their students from universities, and they trained them in a way they need to. They don’t need to deal with teaching on the mass scale. Why should they care about universities? Why do they want to be a part of the universities and losing their freedom, their money, their property. huge buildings, equipment, et cetera? Why should they care about that? To bring that together, a huge incentive should be from both sides. I do believe that the Academic Excellence Initiative project was a very good attempt to bring science into universities, but it didn’t work well in terms of organizational nurture of the academy and university sector. I believe that there’s a huge divide between universities and research sector which was introduced again by Bolsheviks in the early stage of the reforms. I should stress that one of the reasons why they did that was political reasons. There’s a huge divide now, and it creates huge problems for many aspects of Russian higher education system.
AU: You mentioned the 5-100 project which I think is interesting. That’s where the Russian state and the Russian universities started to push to expand research into universities and make a mark in various world university rank rankings. My take on the 5-100 project, which was meant to get five Russian universities into the world top hundred, is that it started with a completely unrealistic goal that was never going to happen. But that nevertheless, the process was one that did some good. Now you’ve written about this in the book, Academic Star Wars, which we’ve covered on this podcast a couple months ago. Is that right? Is that a fair assessment of the 5-100, unrealistic but still doing good?
MY: I would say yes, briefly. But in more detail, I would say that the goal itself was not perfectly defined in the very beginning, because at that time when the presidential decree was signed, nobody in the country knew what global rankings meant. So, the decree didn’t mention what kind of rankings or what type of rankings. For example, later some experts suggested to treat the word ranking is a subject ranking. If you don’t think about general rankings, but think about the subject ranking, many universities did the job of entering 100 in different major rankings, right? The goal was not defined, so it was achieved in a way. But, what was important was the vector was perfectly determined and defined. I would mention probably two important aspects. First is research mission of university. Universities should be not just about teaching, but also about research. It was quite new for many institutions in the country. Also, internationalization would become an important pillar for every institution. Even the key performance indicator, most of them were somehow related to either research or internationalization. Second, rethinking strategies. For many institutions, they started to remove their thinking from process-oriented life such as we get some money from the ministry, and we do something for the ministry. To a more project-based approach. What is our mission? What are our goals? How do we achieve them? Of course, there was an effect not on just participating institutions which were huge, but also on the system in general. I would say yes, it definitely did good.
AU: Another really important change in Russia after the Soviet Union fell apart, was that universities regained quite a bit of institutional autonomy. So even if they were poor, they could set their own directions because deans and rectors were elected by academic staff. But that changed in 2014, the rectors at public universities since then have been appointed directly by the Ministry of Education. Obviously that puts institutions under much tighter political control. How much has that changed how institutions have been able to pursue their education and research missions?
MY: I think it’s a hard question especially for today. I don’t think that there were any periods in the Russian higher education system history where institutions had some substantial political autonomy. In some period, government was just not interested in what happens with university or inside university. But it doesn’t mean that they have freedom, right? After collapse of Soviet Union, Russian Universities got more broad economic rights. They started using this kind of rights in different ways. But political rights, I believe, didn’t come together with economic rights. And at some point of history, the government decided to exercise their legal rights in more full scale. It doesn’t mean that rights were taken out of universities. Nothing’s changed, I would say. Another type of control is that there always been a strict organizational control, which comes with government money. It’s every five cents that Russian university gets from the government, it should produce a lot of paperwork and a lot of constraints are introduced with this kind of money. Even though there are many rights, including economic rights and probably some political rights, universities are controlled so much by routines and reporting, that in many cases that has defined what happens in the university in a more substantial way than any other types of rights.
AU: You’re very critical in your book about the rigidity of curriculum in Russian universities and point out the ways in which it’s difficult to make programs, which are more relevant to the modern labour market. I’m wondering why that is? Is that because of regulatory barriers which come from government? Or is it something within the academic profession that prefers not to modernize? Is it something else? What’s the root cause here of this problem?
MY: Even in the 19th century, Russian higher education systems and universities had the same quite rigid curriculum. Why was that? Because the government accepted graduates of Russian universities as the public servants. If you accept people as a public servant, you want to control what type of people are trained in the university, in which ways they are trained. There is a huge history of rigid curriculum in Russian universities. In Soviet times, it was because as I said earlier, every institution train people for some particular factories, industries, etc. Now I think there are still many reasons for that. I think that the whole idea, even in the market economy, still bears a lot of specific features which speak to the idea of planning. There is so much planning in our Russian higher education system, which somehow contradicts the whole logic of the market economy. So, institutions are in some way between some market logic and this residual of the planning logic. So, universities has good budget for teaching students and introducing more stories is related to many different barriers. And of course, economic profession probably in general is interested, but in many cases, academic profession is just interested in reproducing itself. So, for every particular faculty, sometimes it’s much easier to teach the same type of courses every year, especially taking into account the huge teaching load for faculty members in Russian institutions. I think that explains why we have that now.
AU: In 2022, just after your book was published, and also just after the invasion of Ukraine, the governor of the Russian Federation indicated that they wree introducing another set of sweeping changes to the system by abandoning the Bologna three year system and many other things. What were the key elements of these announced changes? And do you think they’re likely to last very long? Or is this a new system that’s unlikely to outlive Vladimir Putin?
MY: Here we go back to our initial question and points. Every government, every political regime in the country wants a higher education system to serve the needs of the economy and society in a way that this regime understands that. So now, the idea is that the Russian higher education system should go away from 4 plus 2 system and go toward a 5 or 6 years plus potential master appendix, and it’s still discussed. I think the whole idea is to prepare the system to work and to function under severe isolation and to be able to be competitive for in industrial sectors to have more investments in computer sciences, IT, and engineering, and also to train more people in this area, again, to be able to compete with other economies under the constraints of political isolation. I think that’s their main idea. We might think about different kinds of chambers, but I do believe that there are so much dictated by political ideas and political regimes, so we just can now wonder what’s going to happen.
AU: If you look back at the 30 years between 1992 and 2022, What were the biggest points of success of the Russian higher education system? Are there some strengths from the last couple of decades that can be built on to make an even better system for the future? Or is there going to be a need to start over again after the isolation ends?
MY: That’s a hard question. From one side, what we managed to do in those I would say 30 years is to build a system which was to a huge extent integrated in the global academic community and the global market for higher education and to compete there and to create some universities which were probably world class universities or close to be world class universities. So, Russian higher education system really became an integral part and quite important part of the global society and global community in terms of research and education. How can you measure success? I think it’s a quite sad question because what we see now is that a lot of things are destroyed, like in terms of faculty brain drain. There are huge changes in curriculum and huge changes in our faculty composition and everything. So, I would probably say personally that a huge success are students who are trained during those 30 years and now work for many countries in the world, to change the world for better, and are actually the citizens of the world. Not being stuck toward one particular country, one particular plant, or one particular industry. For me, which now looks what happens with Russian higher education and how system is destroyed, I think it’s the biggest success. That’s human capital which can never be destroyed. That would be my answer, probably.
AU: That’s all the time we have for today. Maria. Thank you very much indeed. It just remains for me to thank our excellent producers, Tiffany MacLennan and Sam Pufek, and you, the listener, for tuning in. If you have any comments on this podcast or suggestions for future episodes, please do not hesitate to contact us at [email protected]. Join us again next week when our guest will once again be Australian higher education expert, Andrew Norton. He’ll be joining us to discuss the university’s accord, which was just released by the Australian government last month. Talk to you then. |
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