Sin que aún se hayan dado a conocer los planteamientos de la candidatura Bachellet para al educación superior, circula la idea de que su comisión programática estaría proponiendo la gratuidad a la entrada de la enseñanza terciaria con pago posterior de un “graduate tax” como se conoce desde fines de los años 60 en la literatura especializada; o sea, un impuesto específico al ingreso de los graduados/titulados, con la idea de que retornen a la sociedad (o, al menos al Estado) una cuota sobre el premio salarial que reciben en el mercado laboral por la inversión  que la sociedad ha hecho en ellos al dotarlos de un “plus” de capital humano.

El principio subyacente a este impuesto específico es muy similar al que justifica el otorgamiento de créditos subisidiados y con devolución contingente al ingreso.

Es una idea que se ha venido discutiendo en círculos académico-técnicos y políticos desde hace medio siglo y no se ha aplicado en ningún país, ni siquiera en Australia donde a veces se dice equivocadamente que existiría tal impuesto, pues los economistas y contadores esgrimen una serie de argumentos en contra de su adopción, tanto por razones de la lentitud en recuperar los fondos gastados en educación superior de la renta nacional, su menor equidad comparativa con el mecanismos de los creditos contingentes al ingreso y, sobre todo, porque traslada el flujo d eingresos que implican los,p`réstamos desde la universidad al estado, con el riesgo de que éste luego los redistribuya desde las universidades que forman a los  graduados de menores ingreso y menor status hacia las universidades más selectivas, caras y de mayor prestigio y marca en cuanto a los títulos que expide.

Como sea, es una idea que necesitaría discutirse razonablemente y en el mérito de su valor para la política pública, pues es una solución que –como los créditos y becas– mantiene la idea (razonable y justificada por motivos de equidad) de que la educación superior genera, además de beneficios sociales, significativos beneficios privados que deben ser “pagados” por quien los aprocvecha y obtiene ventajas de ellos.

A continuación una selección de artículos académicos recientes sobre el tema, la noticia local sobre un posible planteamiento político-programático respecto al impuesto a los graduados, la reacción de algunos dirigentes estudiantiles y luego un par de artículos sobre la polémica inglesa en torno al graduate tax.

Documentos de análisis académico del graduate tax:

— Universities as Stakeholders in their Students’ Careers: On the Benefits of Graduate Taxes to Finance Higher Education. Ver aquí <PDF>

— Nicholas Barr:  20 reasons why a graduate tax is a bad idea. Ver aquí <PDF>

— Lorraine Dearden,Institute of Education, University of London and Institute for Fiscal Studies, Alissa Goodman,Institute for Fiscal Studies, Greg Kaplan, University of Pennsylvania and Institute for Fiscal Studies, Gill Wyness, Institute for Fiscal Studies, Future arrangements for fundinghigher education, 2010. Ver aquí <PDF>

— David Greenaway and Michelle Haynes, FUNDING HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UK: THE ROLE OF FEES AND LOANS. Ver aquí <PDF>

Impuesto a los profesionales sorprendió al movimiento estudiantil: “No parece razonable”

El Dínamo, 29 de mayo de 2013 – 13:16 | Por: Nicolás Sepúlveda |

Los estudiantes criticaron que en la propuesta que analiza Michelle Bachelet no se mencione la renacionalización de los recursos naturales como un mecanismo para financiar la educación.

Este martes la comisión de educación convocada por Michelle Bachelet entregó su propuesta de reforma educacional. En el documento, que se le hizo llegar al encargado programático del comando de la candidata PS-PC-PPD-MAS, Alberto Arenas, se plantea que la educación gratuita universal se financie con una reforma tributaria y con la creación de un impuesto especial dirigido exclusivamente a los profesionales.

La iniciativa sorprendió a los dirigentes estudiantiles, quienes ya manifestaron sus reparos. El presidente de la FECH, Andrés Fielbaum, criticó que se le cobré a los profesionales sin considerar la evasión tributaria de los grandes empresarios “no parece razonable que, por ejemplo, un profesional con bajo sueldo o incluso cesante tenga que estar pagando impuestos altos, más aún cuando unos pocos empresarios concentran tanta riqueza y tienen mil formas de eludir impuestos. O teniendo tanto recurso natural que no deja su riqueza en Chile”.

La renacionalización de los recursos naturales es un tema que los estudiantes echaron de menos en la propuesta. Así lo expresó el presidente de la Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Concepción, Javier Miranda “me parece que no recoge realmente el sentido de lo que el movimiento está impulsando. El mecanismo de la reforma tributaria pasa, pero el tema del impuesto específico para profesionales viene a ser muy similar al tema crediticio y de la deuda. O sea, por estudiar vas a tener que después pagar un impuesto más… no me parece convincente. Además, no menciona el tema de los recursos naturales, como la renacionalización del cobre, que es un tema que ha sido planteado y que no es mencionado en esta propuesta”.

El vocero de los secundarios de la ACES, Pablo Toro, coincidió con los universitarios y planteó que “nosotros hemos sido claros en decir que la forma para financiar la educación gratuita recae en la nacionalización de los recursos naturales del país”. El escolar criticó además que no se los incluya en la elaboración de propuestas y cuestionó que sólo ingenieros trabajaran la propuesta de Bachelet “hay que entender que los cambio que Chile necesita para la educación debe hacerse con los estudiantes de por medio y si vemos el equipo de Bachelet tenemos puros ingenieros que siguen con esta visión tecnócrata de la educación”.

Desconfianza

Más allá de la valoración, positiva o negativa, de la propuesta de la comisión de educación de Bachelet, los estudiantes continuaron expresando la desconfianza que sienten para con la candidata. El presidente de la FEUC, Diego Vela, manifestó que “hemos visto una propuesta similar que fue escrita por Fernando Atria, y si se basa en eso, podría ser una buena medida. El tema es como asegura Bachelet sacar esto adelante, si el 2007 sacó proyectos de ley que inicialmente buscaban prohibir el lucro y finalmente terminó aprobando una Ley General de Educación que apuntó en el sentido contrario”.

Andrés Fielbaum coincidió en ese punto de vista “poco importa lo que opine un equipo de asesores cuando al interior de la Concertación gobiernan conflictos de interés tremendos que impiden atacar el negociado en que han transformado nuestra educación. Bachelet ya tuvo un primer acercamiento a la gratuidad cuando llegó y no por nada en menos de una semana tuvo que desdecirse. ¿Con qué partidos lo hará?, ¿Con los mismos que no pudo conducir a algo tan poco importante como las primarias parlamentarias?”.

“Los cambios deben generarse a través de los movimientos sociales, porque entre los políticos no están dadas las condiciones”, complementó Vela.

La nueva vocera de la ACES, Isabel Salgado, agregó que la discusión no debe centrarse solamente en el financiamiento de la educación “creemos que independiente de como se desarrolle el tema del financiamiento a la educación, estamos apuntando a cual va a ser la educación que nos van a entregar. Porque tiene que ser gratuita… pero también tiene que ser de excelencia, y sobre eso no se ha dicho nada”. 

La vocera de los escolares finaliza indicando que deberán discutir la propuesta “vamos a tener que informarnos más y leer la propuesta para tener una postura más definitiva. Lo vamos a revisar en asamblea y lo discutiremos”.

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Is the graduate tax actually fairer?

Paying for education indefinitely is more likely to act as a deterrent to poor students.

By Samira Shackle , The New Statesman, Published 15 July 2010 12:08

In his first key speech on higher education, Vince Cable has outlined proposals for cutting costs in universities. The graduate tax, which Cable claims would be fairer and more sustainable, has attracted the most attention.

Under the current system, students take a loan from the government which they use to pay their tuition fees and part of their living costs. This is paid back gradually when the graduate starts earning more than £15,000.

At first glance, that sounds rather similar to the measure being proposed — money is paid over someone’s career, and the amount increases with earnings. The main difference is that the graduate tax will be infinite; in effect, it will mean that graduates are permanently paying a higher rate of income tax.

The jury is out on whether this is “progressive” or not. The main argument in its favour is that it would be linked to income, meaning that high earners will ultimately pay more and could subsidise those less well off.

Ed Balls — a proponent of the graduate tax — said it means that graduates will contribute to costs, “but only once they are in work and clearly based on their ability to pay”.

I’m not convinced by this. It is already the case that repayments start only once you are earning, and the situation would presumably stay the same if fees were to rise further. The difference is that, currently, everyone ends up paying the same amount, whereas the idea under the new system would be for the rich to end up paying more.

There are many problems with this. While the National Union of Students has been advocating a graduate tax for the past four years, they have also pointed out that a graduate tax can fail to take into account the diminishing importance of education and the increased role of work experience in establishing a career (note: they believe that their proposed model neutralises this). Paul Cottrell of the University and College Union (UCU) argues that poor graduates could even end up paying a higher percentage of their income through a tax than through a loan system.

Two years ago, Sutton Trust research on the impact of tuition fees showed that teenagers from poorer families were forgoing a university education because they were concerned about debt.

Another argument for a graduate tax is that abolishing the upfront payment aspect would remove this deterrent. This is disingenuous. As it stands, it is assumed that you will pay back your fees at a later date. You fill in a form for a loan, and the money goes straight to the university without passing through your bank account.

While a graduate tax could be framed as the abolition of fees, I find it difficult to believe that essentially paying for your education for ever would be less of a deterrent than a fixed amount of debt. Surveys have shown students concerned that they will be paying back their student debt for a decade; surely, permanently paying more tax is worse?

I’m inclined to agree with Sally Hunt of the UCU, who has called the proposal “an exercise in rebranding”. Isn’t this just higher fees by a different name?

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Graduate tax: remedy, reform or rebrand?

Last week the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, suggested a graduate tax as a ‘fairer’ replacement for tuition fees in higher education. All the Labour leadership candidates – with the exception of David Miliband – have expressed support for this idea, as has the National Union of Students; the leading universities, meanwhile, have opposed it. This Observation examines whether the rationale for such a policy and the practical implications of it have been fully considered.

As Dr Cable acknowledges, the current system of income-contingent loan repayments already constitutes an implicit graduate tax. Students face a notional stock of debt upon graduation, reflecting the total fee and maintenance loans taken out over their degree. However, this debt merely determines the amount of time that a graduate will spend making repayments. The actual repayments depend only on income, being equal to 9% of earnings above £15,000 for a maximum of 25 years following graduation. After this point, any remaining debt is written off.

The system is already progressive, insofar as lower-earning graduates: (i) make smaller monthly repayments (both in cash terms and as a proportion of their income); (ii) benefit more from a subsidised interest rate; and (iii) are more likely to have some of their debt written off.

A graduate tax in its purest form is simply a variant of this with an infinite loan and without a debt write-off point. Whereas a current graduate’s repayments stop at some point, their payments under a pure graduate tax would not, creating the possibility for high-earning graduates to pay substantially more over their working life than what it cost to educate them. We understand that a time limit is has been considered as a central feature of the policy, which would mitigate this issue – and, in so doing, come closer to the present repayment schedule -but it would still be possible for the highest-earning graduates to pay back significantly more than the cost of their degree.

At the other end of the spectrum, it may be possible for lower-earning graduates to pay less over their career than they do now, making the spread of contributions more progressive than under the current system. However, the greater progressivity comes with the risk of inducing unintended behaviour, such studying abroad – and thereby avoiding liability for the tax – if the fees abroad are less than the net present value of a student’s expected future graduate tax bill. An incentive could also be created for students to work abroad after university, in order to avoid paying the tax.

Part of the Business Secretary’s aim in mooting the idea of a graduate tax is to increase the contribution to higher education provided by graduates while reducing the contribution from general taxation. But if cuts are made, it is unlikely that the revenue from a graduate tax would fill the hole quickly. If high-earning graduates respond to the above incentives, the loss of tax revenue would have negative implications for the public finances – particularly as these individuals would be relied upon to effectively subsidise lower-earning graduates. Also, behavioural responses notwithstanding, any revenue from the tax would arrive in Treasury coffers at a slow rate, and a question then arises over how universities are to be funded in the interim.

Introducing an alternative system of funding may be politically expedient, but it raises additional issues. Tuition fees provide a transparent source of income which follows the individual, giving universities an incentive to attract and retain students. Under a graduate tax, it is not clear how allocations to individual institutions would be determined, and whether this incentive would remain. There would also be no obvious, transparent way of allowing contributions to vary according to the university attended or course studied. Furthermore, fees enable students to make judgements about the effectiveness or value for money that universities offer; under a graduate tax, this not possible.

Finally, the tax would replace fee loans only – maintenance loans would continue to be repaid under the current arrangements. While this seems more sensible than using a graduate tax as the only method of repayment, operating two separate repayment systems in parallel would increase the complexity of a funding regime that is already poorly understood.

A graduate tax is the latest in a series of options under consideration by the Browne Review as it explores ways to reform university funding. Alternative possible measures include increasing tuition fees, introducing a real interest rate on student loans or tweaking some other aspects of the current funding system. An IFS Commentary, Future arrangements for funding higher education, published earlier this year, has considered such options in detail, examining their likely effects on graduates and the public finances.